

(Towards Transparency, Accountability and Integrity)

BHUTAN TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
Opposite to Central Plaza
Olakha, Thimphu:bhutan
Post Box No. 01592
Thimphu, 11001, Bhutan
Tel: +975-2-340921
Fax: +975-2-340923

Website: www.bhutantransparency.org

NATIONAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER REPORT (NCBR) 2020 BHUTAN

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Bhutan Transparency Initiative (BTI)

Bhutan Transparency Initiative (BTI) is a registered CSO (Public Benefit Organization) with a mandate to promote Accountability, Transparency, and Integrity in the country. BTI is committed to contribute towards building a just and equitable society in which communities thrive and there is no space for corruption to function.

Contact Address:

BHUTAN TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE Opposite to Central Plaza Olakha, Thimphu:bhutan Post Box No. 01592 Thimphu, 11001, Bhutan

Tel: +975-2-340921 Fax: + 975-2-340923

Website: www.bhutantransparency.org

About this Report

The NCBR 2020 was carried out with financial support from the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bhutan. NCBR is a longitudinal study and one of the key initiatives of BTI to determine the level and trend of corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs in the country. The overall methodology for the study was adapted from the Transparency International's (TI) Global Corruption Barometer Survey (GCBS).

Every effort was made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of July 2020.

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The researchers of this report were:

Dr. Sonam Tshering

- Aum Pema Lhamo

Kinley Drukpa

Edited by: Dr. Rinzin Rinzin

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FOREWORD

Bhutan Transparency Initiative (BTI) a registered CSO (PBO) is committed to enhance transparency, integrity and accountability in Bhutan through the provision of policy-oriented research, development of training tools and facilitation of policy dialogues. Thus we continue to formulate suitable research strategies that contribute to more effective generation of knowledge on the corruption situation in the country. One very important research has been identified as the national corruption barometer study (NCBS) which is projected to be conducted once in every three years. The first NCBS was conducted in 2016.

BTI is very pleased to present the 2nd National Corruption Barometer Report (NCBR), the NCBR 2020 The study sought information on the levels of corruption, forms of corruption, the quality of the delivery of public services, effectiveness and support of existing anti-corruption initiatives, access to anti-corruption services, delivery of justice and in general the degree of corruption in the country.

Although this research on corruption situation in the country is limited and will not be able to answer many questions, particularly, on the dynamics of corruption at various sectoral, sub-sectoral and institutional levels both nationally and locally, this study will serve as an important baseline in assessing the general level of corruption experience and perception. As such, the report will facilitate in developing anti-corruption interventions that match against the causes thereby ensuring some degree of effectiveness of actions against corruption. However, detailed dynamics or qualitative information on the process and events are outside the scope of this type of study. We are hopeful that the findings of the report will be used to design relevant interventions to strengthen initiatives against corruption in our country.

I take this opportunity to reiterate that BTI will continue to work with the relevant institutions to advise on how to seal the corruption loopholes existent in their systems, processes, procedures and practices. I would like to thank ACC for the financial support to conduct the study. I would also like to acknowledge and thank the respondents from the general public for their frank participation during the Survey and look forward to their continued support in our future endeavors.

Finally, I call upon all to read this Report and work with us to enhance transparency and accountability in our country.

Pema Lhamo

Executive Director

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC Anti-Corruption Commission
BKP Bhutan Kuen-Nyam Party
BTI Bhutan Transparency Initiative
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index
CSO Civil Society Organization
DNT Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa
DPT Druk Phuensum Tshogpa

EA Enumeration Area **FYP** Five-Year Plan

GCB Global Corruption Barometer

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NCBS National Corruption Barometer Survey
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations

NKRA National Key Result Area
NSB National Statistics Bureau

ODK Open Data Kit

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PDP People's Democratic Party

PHCB Population and Housing Census of Bhutan

PPS Probability Proportion to Size

PPSWR Probability Proportion to Size with Replacement

PSU Primary Sampling Unit

SDC Swiss Development Cooperation

SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

SRS Simple Random Sampling

SRSWOR Simple Random Sampling Without Replacement

TI Transparency International

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Corruption Barometer Survey (NCBS) is one of the key initiatives of the Bhutan Transparency Initiative (BTI) to determine the level and trend of corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs in the country. BTI conducted the first survey in 2016 with technical support from Transparency International (TI) and funding from Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The main objective of the 2016 study was to provide a reference point for awareness, education, and advocacy programs, including facilitating evidence-based policy interventions to combat corruption more effectively. The findings from the 2016 study have provided a useful reference data not only for Bhutan but also on a global level. Global Corruption Barometer is being published by TI and Bhutan's Corruption Barometer Survey provides an opportunity to understand Bhutan's standing in terms of corruption perception and anti-corruption strategies.

NCBS 2020 was carried out under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ACC and BTI to understand the corruption situation in the country based on the perception of the citizens and thereby establish reference points for awareness, education, and advocacy to facilitate the achievement of the 12th National Key Result Area (NKRA) "Corruption Reduced" in the 12th Five-Year Plan and beyond.

The study was carried out using the Embedded Correlational Model to assess citizens' perception of corruption. The overall methodology for the study was adapted from the Transparency International's (TI) Global Corruption Barometer Survey (GCBS). Some of the parameters that were considered for the study centered around forms, causes, concentration, and levels of corruption in the country. The data were collected via mobile tablets using open-source software Open Data Kit technology. A total of 1,152 respondents (68% from rural areas and 32% from urban areas) were interviewed.

The results of the study were compared with the findings of NCBS 2016 as well as with that GCBS 2017 wherever possible. Some of the key findings of the study were:

- Corruption is a growing concern in the country and there is a need for the citizens to engage more against corruption;
- The top five forms of corruption in order of prevalence are trading influence, failure to declare conflict of interest, abuse of function, bribery, and embezzlement;
- The government ministries topped the list in all of the five most prevalent forms of corruption;
- 72% of the respondents cited insatiable wants, followed by low moral values and strong protective social net of the accused as the main causes of corruption;
- Corruption is predominantly concentrated at the executive level of all organizations;
- 31.5% of the respondents believe corruption has increased in the last three years and is a very serious problem in the country;
- 60.3% of the respondents mentioned that they would vote for clean political candidates and parties or avoid/refuse to pay bribes or report corruption;
- Those who hold the view that corruption can be fought by voting for clean candidates and parties shot up from 11.0% in 2016 to 60.0% in 2020; and,
- Other findings include perceptions on the present government's handling of corruption in the government, promoting good governance and upholding respect for the rule of law; the role of political parties in preventing corruption and promoting good governance; AAC's effectiveness in controlling corruption; corruption in elections; role of media in preventing corruption and promoting good governance; role of CSOs in preventing corruption and/or promoting anti-corruption initiatives; effectiveness of social accountability; ACC's education and advocacy programs; type of services prone to corruption, and; Emerging challenges.

Since the forms of corruption prevalent in the country and its causes have not drastically changed in the last 4 years, some of the key recommendations are:

- i. Explore systems and mechanisms to encourage proactive sharing of information by agencies in public domain;
- ii. Review existing systems for recruitment and performance evaluation of executives across all categories of agencies;
- iii. Initiate proactive interventions to curb corruption in human resource, construction, and procurement services:
- iv. Enact and implement Whistleblower Protection Act;
- v. Establish office of the ombudsman to address administrative complaints;
- vi. Enhance measures to curb corruption in elections;
- vii. The government support the capacity building of the media and CSOs in promoting good governance;
- viii. Upscale social accountability program to make it more extensive and inclusive;
- ix. The ACC extend its advocacy and education programs to promote awareness of the general public on corruption related areas to include/rope in other relevant partners both at the grassroots and national levels in order to promote multiplier effect; and,
- x. Institute and implement mechanisms to enhance civic responsibility and accountability.

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND

The National Corruption Barometer Survey (NCBS), a longitudinal study, is one of the key initiatives of the Bhutan Transparency Initiative (BTI) to determine the level and trend of corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs in the country. BTI conducted the first survey in 2016 with technical support from Transparency International (TI) and funding support from Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The main objective of the 2016 study was to provide a reference point for awareness, education, and advocacy programs, including facilitating evidence-based policy interventions to combat corruption more effectively. The findings from the 2016 study have provided a useful reference data not only for Bhutan but also on a global level. Global Corruption Barometer is being published by TI and Bhutan's Corruption Barometer Survey provides an opportunity to understand Bhutan's standing in terms of corruption perception and anti-corruption strategies.

Fighting corruption in Bhutan is a development imperative wherein the Constitution mandates every citizen to uphold justice and act against corruption. This in principle has fostered strong collective effort to prevent and combat corruption at all levels across the society. Further, a dedicated Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has reinforced the sacred Constitutional responsibility to build a 'happy, harmonious and corruption-free society'.

The NCBS is a key requirement for the assessment of the 12th National Key Result Area (NKRA) – Corruption Reduced in the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP). It was planned that two NCBS would be conducted during the plan period, the first in 2019, and the second towards the end of 2022. The NCBS would become an important baseline in the 12th FYP as it would benchmark the citizens' perception of corruption around forms, causes, levels, concentration and trend as well as the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the country.

As the lead agency in preventing and combating corruption, the ACC has introduced numerous policies, strategies, and tools to prevent and combat corruption. Agencies are increasingly endorsing the advantages of adopting integrity and anti-corruption tools and measures for internal safeguard. Towards the long-term sustainability of the anti-corruption campaign, the ACC has been making conscious efforts to integrate anti-corruption agenda in the overall planning process.

The 12th FYP has a dedicated NKRA as 'Corruption Reduced' for greater momentum in mainstreaming anticorruption measures. The synthesis and triangulation of the NCBS, ACC's research findings and their administrative data, including TI's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), among others would help in gauging the achievement of the NKRA.

The NCBS 2020 is being implemented under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ACC and BTI.

1.1 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the NCBS 2020 are to:

- i. Assess the citizens' perception of corruption around forms, causes, concentration, and levels in the country; and
- ii. Establish a reference point for awareness, education, and advocacy to reduce corruption in the 12th FYP and beyond.

CHAPTER 2: STUDY METHODOLOGY

2.1 Study Design

The NCBS, 2020 was carried out using an Embedded Design of Embedded Correlational Model (Figure 1) wherein a qualitative component was embedded within a quantitative design. The qualitative data and information played a supplementary role. Quantitative data were collected via a structured questionnaire while qualitative information were obtained through open-ended responses. The questionnaire was adapted from TI's GCB.




Figure 1: Embedded Design: Embedded Correlational Model.

2.2 Target Population and Study Sample

The samples were drawn from all sections of the Bhutanese society. They consisted of civil servants, parliamentarians, business people, private employees, corporate employees, armed force personnel, farmers, housewives, students, local government employees, monastic bodies, and the employees of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

2.3 Sampling Procedures

The sampling was designed to be representative at the regional level with a household as a sampling unit and a household member as a unit of analysis. A stratified multi-stage cluster sampling approach of probability sampling was adopted. In the first stage, using probability proportion to size with replacement (PPSWR), primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected from respective urban and rural master sampling frames obtained from National Statistics Bureau (NSB). In the second stage, a total of 25 households were selected from each of the respective selected enumeration areas (EA). Finally, one household member were drawn from each of the selected households using simple random sampling without replacement (SRSWOR).

2.3.1 Sample Size Determination

The sample size was computed using a standard formula:

$$n = \frac{X^2 N P (1 - P)}{M E^2 (N - 1) + (X^2 P (1 - P))}$$

= 384 (Total population of Bhutan in 2019 as per population projections 2017-2047 = 741,672) Where:

n = sample size

X^2 = Chi-square for the specified confidence level at 1 degree of freedom

N = population size (projected population of Bhutan in 2019 is 741,672)

P = population proportion

ME = desired margin of error

Geographically, Bhutan is divided into three regions, viz. west, center, and east. For the samples to be representative at the regional level, the national sample size (as estimated above) was multiplied by 3 (3 regions): 3*384 = 1152

2.3.2 Sample Allocation and Distribution

A total sample size of 1152, i.e. 384 each from the western, central, and eastern regions were selected from the respective PSUs. As per the Master Sampling Frame developed from Population and Housing Census of Bhutan (PHCB) 2017, 50% of the population in western Bhutan was residing in urban areas. In the central and eastern Bhutan, the population residing in urban areas were 22.0% and 24.0% respectively. The samples were then allocated and distributed according to these population percentages.

Table 1: Sample allocation and distribution.

Region	Urban/ Rural	Population (%)	PSU using PPS	Respondent using SRS
Western (Chukha, Paro, Thimphu, Haa, Samtse, Punakha,	Urban	50	8	200
sa)	Rural	50	8	200
Central (Trongsa, Tsirang, Wangduephodrang, Dagana,	Urban	22	3	75
Zhemgang, Bumthang)	Rural	78	12	300
Eastern (S/Jongkhar, Tashigang, Mongar, Lhuentse,	Urban	24	4	100
Pemagatshel, Sarpang, Tashiyangtse)	Rural	76	12	300
Total:				1175

2.3.3 Demographics

The survey respondents comprised 68.1% from rural areas and the remaining 31.9% from urban areas corresponding to the population in these areas (Figure 2). This has resulted in selecting 32.0% of the respondents from the central region and the rest equally split between western and eastern regions (Figure 3). In terms of gender representation, equal numbers of males and females were selected (Figure 4).




Figure 2: Respondents by areas




Figure 3: Respondents by regions




Figure 4: Respondents by gender

Among these respondents, a sizeable proportion were married, followed by never married and divorced (Figure 5). Regarding the age range of the respondents, 31.0% of them fell between 21 to 30 years of age (Figure 6). A total of 28.5% of the respondents were illiterates while 14.5% each had completed higher secondary education and bachelor's degree (Figure 7).




Figure 5: Respondents by marital status




Figure 6: Respondents by age-band




Figure 7: Respondents by the level of education

Majority (41.7%) of the respondents were farmers followed by businessmen (17.7%), students (8.8%) and the rest were either public servants, corporate/private employees or armed forces (Figure 8).




Figure 8: Respondents by occupation

2.4 Organization of the Survey

The principal consultant from BTI, with the support of the technical advisory committee comprising members from BTI and the ACC, led the study. Three teams of enumerators – one for each region administered the survey questionnaires. The enumerators were selected based on their familiarity with the geographic locations and fluency in local dialects.

2.5 Training of Enumerators and Piloting

The enumerators were trained on survey questionnaire, field procedure, and interview protocol. Upon completion of the training and before deployment of the enumerators to the field, a pre-testing of the survey tools and methods was carried out in the enumeration areas that were not selected for the actual survey. The questionnaire was then perfected on mobile tablets.

2.6 Monitoring during the Field Work

A multi-layered structure of supervision was organized during the fieldwork. Three regional supervisors led the teams in the field. Each of them was responsible for monitoring the progress and ensuring the data quality before feeding data to a central server. Additionally, officials from BTI also carried out independent random on-site monitoring. The three supervisors reported directly to the central coordinator who verified the quality of the data on a real-time basis.

2.7 Data Collection and Management

The data were collected via mobile tablets using open-source software Open Data Kit (ODK) technology.

2.8 Data Tabulation and Analysis

Dataset imported from ODK was cleaned, coded, and analyzed employing basic statistical analysis techniques such as frequency and percentage analysis and cross-tabulation. Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS version 22.

CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS

3.1 Forms of Corruption

The respondents were requested to indicate their agreement or disagreement on a 4-item scale of strongly agree, partly agree, disagree, and do not know about the prevalence of the different forms of corruption offenses in the country.

Taking account of the item scale strongly agree, the top five forms of corruption in the order of prevalence are trading in influence, failure to declare conflict of interest, abuse of function, bribery, and embezzlement. To a large extent, this finding corroborates the results of the Corruption Barometer Survey of 2016 (Bhutan Transparency Initiative, 2016) wherein the most common forms of corruption reported were nepotism and favoritism, and misuse of public funds, properties, and assets. The perception on bribery as an offense of corruption remained the same at 20.4%. Not many believed that money laundering and concealment of corruption proceeds are prevalent in the country as it is evident from Figure 9.




Figure 9: Forms of corruption1

The percentages may exceed 100 as the response items are not mutually exclusive and this applies to all the subsequent chapters where responses are not mutually exclusive.

Trading in influence means a person who has a real or apparent influence on the decision-making of a public servant trades or exchanges his or her influence to obtain an advantage.

Failure to declare a conflict of interest is also a corruption offense. A public servant is required to declare Conflict of Interest for voting or taking part in any decision-making where the public servant or his or her relative or associate has any private or personal interest.

Abuse of functions occurs when a public servant uses his or her position to perform an illegal act or abstains from performing his or her official duties for a private gain. There are two types of abuse of functions - commission amounting to an abuse of functions and omission amounting to an abuse of functions.

Bribery involves offering, promising, giving, accepting, or soliciting an advantage as an inducement or reward for an action, which is illegal or unethical. And advantages include gifts, loans, fees, rewards, or other advantages such as taxes, services, donations, and favours.

Embezzlement occurs when a person entrusted to take care; keep custody; or under control of any Fund, Securities or Properties uses for the purpose it is not intended or legally required, does not remit or deposit a collection of money to where it is intended, fails to produce an account or account the use of it, when demanded by lawful authority or converts it for his/her benefit or benefit of another.

The highest number of respondents (39%) perceived that corruption is prevalent in the areas of human resources comprising recruitment, training, transfer, and promotion, among others (Figure 10). The prevalence of corruption in the areas of elections, public construction, procurement, and mines and minerals is also noticeable among the respondents.




Figure 10: Prevalence of corruption by areas

3.1.1 Forms of corruption by key service providers

When prevalence of corruption is ranked by key service providers, the ministries topped the list in all of the five most prevalent forms of corruption, namely trading in influence, failure to declare a conflict of interest, abuse of function, bribery, and embezzlement.

Trading in influence came out as the number one form of corruption across all service providers. Only a minuscule number of the respondents perceive corruption in monastic bodies.

The different forms of corruption are closely interrelated—where there is a high prevalence of trading in influence, there is also a higher prevalence of failure to declare a conflict of interest and vice versa.




Figure 11: Five most prevalent forms of corruption by key service providers

■ Trading in influence




Figure 12: Forms of corruption by trading in influence




Figure 13: Forms of corruption by failure to declare conflict of interest




Figure 14: Forms of corruption by abuse of function




Figure 15: Forms of corruption by bribery




Figure 16: Forms of corruption by embezzlement

3.2 Causes of corruption

The cause of corruption is principally greed of the people. As high as 72.3% of the respondents cited that the cause of corruption in the country is insatiable wants, followed by low moral values and strong protective social net of the accused (Figure 17). These top three reasons cited as causes of corruption fall under the broader domain of morality and ethics.

The other causes of corruption mentioned herein result from inaction on cases reported, non-enforcement of rules and regulations, weak accountability mechanism, to name a few.




Figure 17: Causes of corruption

The wants which are perceived as a principal cause of corruption increased to 95.0% in 2020 (Figure 18) from 89.0% in 2016. The biggest jump in 2020 from 2016 was observed in the percentage of the respondents who perceived that another cause of corruption is low moral values. The number of respondents who perceived that our moral values are declining is steadily rising. Comparatively, the percentage of the respondents who feel that weak and ineffective media is also a cause of corruption has shot up from 55.0% in 2016 to 78.4% in 2020.




Figure 18: Causes of corruption in 2020 vis-à-vis 2016

3.3 Level of corruption

As indicated by Figure 19, corruption is predominantly concentrated at the executive level of all organizations, from government agencies to corporations, autonomous agencies to local governments, non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations to constitutional bodies, and from the judiciary and armed forces to the private sector. Only around half of them feel that there is corruption at the middle administrative and managerial levels. While the lower supervisory, support, and operational levels are not free from corruption, there is relatively smaller percentage of the respondents who feel corruption exists at the lower levels.

In other words, the executives of corporations, government agencies, and the private sector are the most corrupted. The perception is that corruption is pervasive at all levels in all organizations.




Figure 19: Concentration of corruption

There were a myriad of responses to the question, "how many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?" Three percent (3%) of the respondents believe that all business executives are involved in corruption, 15.1% consider that most of them are involved in corruption and 67.5% think that some of them are involved in corruption (Table 2). The proportion of the respondents who feel the all local government elected leaders are involved in corruption is 2.2%. Although there are not many respondents who think all of the individuals and entities or most of the individuals and entities or none of the individuals and entities are involved in corruption, a majority of the respondents think some of the individuals and entities are involved in corruption.

Table 2: Perception of the number of entities and individuals involved in corruption

Individuals	All of them (%)	Most of them (%)	Some of them (%)	None (%)	Don't know (%)
Business executives	3.1	15.1	67.5	2.1	12.1
Local Government elected leaders	2.2	12.7	73.5	4.2	7.4
Ministers	2.0	8.3	69.4	6.2	14.1
Members of Parliament	1.9	7.8	69.2	5.8	15.3
The Prime Minister and Officials in his office	1.6	8.3	64.0	7.5	18.6
Officials of Law enforcement and regulatory agencies	1.5	8.0	71.6	5.1	13.8
Government officials	1.4	13.9	73.6	3.1	8.0
International organizations	1.2	5.2	69.0	7.8	16.8
Judges/Justices	1.2	6.5	60.0	5.7	26.6
Armed force personnel	1.0	5.5	69.4	6.6	17.4
Service providers	0.9	6.8	75.9	5.1	11.2
Journalists and media personnel	0.8	4.5	62.6	7.2	24.9
CS0s/NG0s	0.8	3.9	54.4	7.0	34.0
Religious figures	0.6	4.1	51.1	22.1	22.0

3.4 Trend of corruption

About three in every ten respondents (31.6%) believe that corruption is a very serious problem in Bhutan (Figure 20). Around 28.3% of the respondents believe that it is a serious problem, and another 28.4% believe that it is a somewhat serious problem. On the contrary, a little more than 8.3% of the respondents rated corruption as a problem that is not serious, and only 0.3% agree that it is not a problem at all. About 3.0% of the respondents refused to provide their opinion claiming that they do not know about the seriousness of the corruption problem in the country.




Figure 20: Trend of corruption

The respondents who reside in the western region have rated corruption as a relatively more serious problem than those residing in the south-eastern region. Around 64.3% of respondents in the urban areas agreed that corruption is a very serious or serious problem in the country as compared to 57.9% of rural counterparts who think the same (Figure 21).




Figure 21: Level of the seriousness of corruption across dzongkhags²

^{*}Data depicted in the map is the mean score of response to the question: 'Is corruption a serious problem in Bhutan?' measured on an itemscale of five, that ranged from 5 'Very serious' to 1 'Not at all'. Darker regions indicate that the problem is perceived to be more serious by the respondents residing in those areas.

To the question, "in your opinion, in the last three years, has the level of corruption in our country changed?" nearly one-third (31.5%) of the respondents mentioned that corruption has increased somewhat in the last three years (Figure 22). About one-fifth (19.0%) of them hold that it has stayed the same while approximately one-fourth (22.6%) of them deem that it has decreased somewhat. The finding on the level of corruption is similar to that of NCBS 2016. It is perceived that interventions and efforts geared towards minimizing corruption in the last three years have had limited impact.




Figure 22: Trend of corruption

Amongst the dzongkhags, the highest percentage of the respondents who expressed that the corruption has increased in the past three year was Paro with 64.0%, followed by Thimphu and Pemagatshel with 57.7% and 56.0% respectively (Figure 23).

The lowest percentage of the respondents who reported that the corruption has increased was reported in Tsirang with 26.7%. On average, 53.8% of the respondents residing in the western region stated that corruption has increased, followed by the respondents in the east (44.3%) and central part of the country (39.7%). Likewise, in the urban and rural areas 52.0% and 43.3% of the respondents respectively opined that the corruption has increased.




Figure 23: Trend of corruption by dzongkhags

Bhutan's place in the Asia-Pacific countries

A few comparisons have been generated based on the latest (2017) Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) of the Asia-Pacific countries (Pring, 2017) under the thematic areas of perceptions of corruption, experiences of corruption, and people speaking out against corruption.

Perceptions of corruption: government action

In the GCB, 2017 the respondents were asked as to how they thought the level of corruption in their country had changed over the last 12 months—whether it had increased, decreased, or stayed the same.

In the case of NCBS, 2020 the respondents were asked if the level of corruption in the country has—increased a lot, increased somewhat, stayed the same, decreased somewhat, or decreased a lot. For a computation purpose, increased a lot and increased somewhat have been summed up and renamed as increased.




Figure 24: Percentage who say corruption has increased

3.5 Bribery

Bribery, in the Bhutanese context involves offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of advantage as an inducement or reward for an action. Advantages include gifts, loans, fees, rewards or other advantages such as taxes, services, donations, and favors.

About 4.0% of the respondents reported of being compelled to pay a bribe to avail government services in the past 12 months (Figure 25). Of those 4.0%, more than half (52.1%) had resorted to bribing a few times, 8.3% many times, and 39.6% only once in the last 12 months.

The proportion of the respondents who have paid bribe is higher in the western (5.5%) and central regions (4.0%) while in the eastern part of the country it is lesser by almost half (2.8%). Bribing is about three times more prevalent in the urban areas (6.9%) as compared to the rural areas (2.8%).

Experiences of corruption: bribery

The respondents were asked whether they were compelled to pay a bribe to avail government services in the previous 12 months.




Figure 25: Government's performance rating

3.6 Reporting and fighting corruption

More than half (60.3%) of the respondents mentioned that they would vote for clean political candidates and parties or avoid/refuse to pay bribes or report corruption when they see or experience it (Figure 26). Around one-sixth (16.3%) of the respondents also said that ordinary people cannot do anything to fight against corruption.




Figure 26: Measures to fight against corruption

A little more than 71.0% of the respondents are of the view that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption (Figure 27). The proportion of the respondents who agree that ordinary people can make a difference is higher among those living in rural areas (73.3%) compared to the urban areas (67.2%).




Figure 27: Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption

As indicated by Figure 28, about 88.0% of the respondents living in Trongsa agreed that ordinary people can make a difference, which is highest among the dzongkhags, followed by people residing in Haa (84.0%), Punakha (80.0%), Wangduephodrang (79.0%), Pemagatshel (76.0%), Lhuntse (76.0%), Mongar (74.7%), and Trashigang (74.0%). The lowest proportion of the respondents who expressed that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption was observed among the southern districts of Dagana, Chukha, Sarpang, Tsirang, and Samtse.




Figure 28: Percentage of respondents who think that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption

When the respondents were asked whether or not they would feel personally obliged to report a corruption act if they have witnessed it, about 78.1% responded they would feel obliged to report a corruption act and that the respondents in the rural areas (79.8%) are more willing to report than those in the urban areas (74.7%) (Table 3). The willingness to report in the central region is 83.7% as compared to the eastern (77.0%) and western regions (74.0%).

There is a drastic increase in the proportion of the respondents who felt personally obliged to report corruption from 2016 to 2020. A similar trend was reported in the respondents' willingness to report corruption even if it required them to spend a day in the court to give evidence. The proportion of the respondents who agreed that it is generally acceptable for people to report corruption if they have witnessed it, has remained relatively the same for both 2020 and 2016.

Table 3: Reporting of corruption, compared between 2016 and 2020

	2016 (%)	2020 (%)
It is generally acceptable for people to report a case of corruption they have witnessed	63.4	62.2
I would report a case of corruption even if I would have to spend a day in court to give evidence	62.3	72.9
If I witness an act of corruption, I would feel personally obliged to report it	65.1	78.1

People speaking out against corruption

According to Tl's GCB 2017, when the respondents were asked whether they felt they could make a difference in the fight against corruption, respondents in most of the countries surveyed, including Bhutan had reported that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption (Figure 29).




Figure 29: Percentage who say that ordinary people can make a difference

Perceived reasons behind the incidences of corruption going unreported

More than one-third (46.9%) of the respondents cited time constraints as a reason for not reporting corruption Figure 30). A little more than one-fifth (21.5%) of the respondents do not know where to report it. Although a decline from 2016 (28.3%), about one-tenth (11.5%) of the respondents still mentioned that reporting corruption will not make a difference.

About 6.5% of the respondents voiced that corruption is normal, and since everyone does it, it does not make sense to report it. This percentage has also decreased from 25.3% in 2016 to 11.5% in 2020. Around 1.5% of the respondents reported that people refuse to report it because officials to whom corrupt practices are to be reported were also involved in corruption themselves.




Figure 30: Reasons for not reporting corruption when it occurs

The study showed that only about one-sixth (18.0%) of the respondents reported that they were aware of the corruption reporting process in place while 82.0% were not aware of the processes (figure 31).

Of those who are familiar with corruption reporting processes, 62.7% reported that the process is easily accessible, effective, user-friendly, simple, and that the informant is well protected. While the majority of them rated the corruption reporting process positively, more than one-third (36.8%) of them indicated that the process is neither simple nor user-friendly or accessible. About one-fourth (26.4%) of the respondents disagreed that the informants are well protected.




Figure 31: Rating of the corruption reporting process

3.7 Perception of government's effectiveness in controlling corruption

In terms of rating the present government in handling and fighting corruption in the government, promoting good governance, and upholding respect for the rule of law, the proportion of the respondents commending the government on the three are 62.0%, 69.4%, and 69.6% respectively (Figure 32).

When compared to the corruption barometer study of 2016, the proportion of the respondents who rated the government well on upholding respect for the rule of law dropped from 82.0% to 69.6% in 2020, promoting good governance from 80.0% to 69.4%, and fighting corruption from 85.0% to 62.0%. There is a notable fall in the respondents' rating of the government in all the three areas of which the greatest drop occurred in their performance in fighting corruption.




Figure 32: Government's effectiveness in controlling corruption

A higher proportion of the respondents residing in the western and central dzongkhags rated the government not doing well in terms of fighting corruption as compared to the respondents from the eastern region.




Figure 33: Effectiveness of government in fighting corruption by dzongkhags1.

⁴Data computed is the mean of the respondents' perception of government measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 "Very bad" to 4 "Very well". Darker areas indicate better performance.

The respondents were asked to rate their own government in terms of how it was performing in fighting corruption—doing well or badly. A little more than 3 in 5 rated Bhutan government as doing well in fighting corruption (Figure 34).




Figure 34: Government's performance rating

3.8 Perception of the role of political parties in preventing corruption and promoting good governance

There is a consistent decline in the percentage of the respondents who say that the registered political parties are effective in preventing corruption (Figures 35 and 36). Those who rated political parties as being ineffective cited a myriad of reasons from political parties being the perpetrators of corruption to being indifferent to corruption upon coming to power to bribing electorates during election campaigns.




Figure 35: Rating political parties on preventing corruption




Figure 36: Rating political parties in general on preventing corruption and promoting good governance

3.9 Perception of ACC's effectiveness in controlling corruption

Before administering the question to assess the perception on ACC's effectiveness in controlling corruption, the respondents were briefed on the mandates of the Anti-Corruption Commission which not only includes investigation but also prevention and education.

As shown in Figure 37, 72% of the respondents rated ACC well on educating the public, and they attributed it to ACC's education and advocacy programs. It was also recommended to implement this advocacy program through outsourcing or partnering with relevant individuals and entities to make it more diverse, wholesome, and above all interesting. Those who rated it badly quoted the reasons being poor participation of commoners in their education and advocacy programs, lack of or limited advocacy campaigns at *gewog, chiwog* and village levels, and recommended that the frequency of the campaigns could be increased and coverage enhanced.

About 75% of the respondents rated ACC well on preventing corruption and those who rated otherwise mentioned that the commission's performance paints a bleak picture of inaction against corruption. They also said that publicizing corruption cases would deter others from committing corruption.

Seventy-four (74) respondents in 100 rated ACC well on investigating corruption. While they lauded the commission's performance, they pointed out that no major crackdown on corruption has taken place in recent memory. The rate of investigation has also weakened despite a spike in corruption offenses. Delay in investigation, they reported is a major impediment to a corruption investigation.

Of the four mandates of the commission, namely prevention of corruption, investigating corruption, public education, and handling of corruption complaints, the respondents rated handling of corruption complaints the lowest (60%). They stated that once the complaint has been filed, getting updates from the Commission is often a futile endeavor.

The proportion of the respondents who rated ACC well on combating corruption has decreased from 88.9% in 2016 to 74.6% in 2020. Conversely, there is an increase of 3.5% in the respondents who rated badly from 3.5% in 2016 to 7% in 2020.




Figure 37: ACC's effectiveness in controlling corruption

3.10 Perception of corruption in elections

Two broad questions were posed to gauge the perception of corruption in the last general and local government elections: (a) "Have you experienced being offered any payment in the form of cash or kind or favor to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last general election?"; and (b) "Have you experienced being intimidated or influenced to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last local government election?"

Experiences of bribes being offered or being intimidated were sought from the respondents at the three levels of: (i) their own, (ii) their household members and (iii) citizens in their respective constituencies. It showed that the respondents are not as prone and gullible to corruption as other members of their household and that of the members from their constituency.

About 5% of the respondents reported having experienced bribes being offered in the form of cash or kind or favor to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last general election (Figure 38). When asked about their household and constituency members, the percentages escalated to 8.3% and 24.1% respectively. In the case of having experienced intimidation or influence to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last local government election, the responses were 4.0%, 4.4%, and 16.9% respectively.

In a relative sense, a greater number of constituents experienced bribes being offered or being influenced and intimidated during the last general election than in the local government election. Constituents are often bribed or influenced by way of presenting a gift which is a part and parcel of Bhutanese culture and tradition.




Figure 38: Experiences of any payment being offered in the form of cash or kind or favor to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last general election.




Figure 39: Experiences of being intimidated or influenced to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last local government election




Figure 40: Intensity of corruption in elections. (Percentage of the respondents who reported they have come across someone in their constituency who have been paid to vote for a particular candidate or party in the last general election by dzongkhags. Darker areas indicate a higher incidence of corruption.)

3.11 Perception of the role of media in preventing corruption and promoting good governance

In general, all forms of media are rated as effective in preventing corruption, creating deterrence, and promoting good governance (Figures 41, 42 ad 43). The role of media in preventing corruption included reporting on awareness programs being carried out by the ACC and creating deterrence by reporting on corruption through investigative journalism. The respondents also mentioned that the media report on good governance systems and initiatives were useful.

Television is rated very effective, followed by social media for preventing corruption, creating deterrence and promoting good governance. Traditional forms of media such as print and radio are rated less effective in carrying out these three functions.




Figure 41: Role of media in preventing corruption




Figure 42: Role of media in creating deterrence




Figure 43: Role of media in promoting good governance

A higher proportion of the respondents living in rural areas as compared to urban counterparts reported that radio and television are effective in preventing corruption (Figure 44). Contrary to this is the case of print and social media.




Figure 44: Effectiveness of various forms of media in preventing corruption by area

Illiterate respondents and those with lower educational achievement rated radio and television over social media and print in terms of their effectiveness in preventing corruption (Figure 45).




Figure 45: Effectiveness of various media channels in preventing corruption by education level

3.12 Perception of the role of CSOs in preventing corruption and/or promoting anti-corruption initiatives

More than one in two (51.9%) of the respondents are oblivious of the role of CSOs in preventing and promoting anti-corruption initiatives (Figure 46). A little more than one-third (36.9%) of the respondents rated the role of CSOs in preventing and promoting good governance as effective.




Figure 46: Effectiveness of CSOs in preventing corruption and/or promoting anti-corruption activities

3.13 Effectiveness of social accountability

Only 16.0% of the respondents reported that they are aware of the term social accountability. According to some of them, the term pertains to making those in power accountable for the decision they make. To some, it means the government is transparent in its dealings. There are also others to whom social accountability means our social obligation to fellow citizens.

Out of 16.0% who reported possessing some knowledge on social accountability, around half of them think that there is an enabling environment to practice social accountability in the country. Similarly, 64.0% and 65.0% rated that social accountability is effective in promoting good governance and preventing corruption respectively (Figure 47).




Figure 47: Effectiveness of social accountability in preventing corruption and promoting good governance

3.14 ACC's education and advocacy programs

A little more than one-tenth (11.5%) of the respondents have attended ACC's education and advocacy programs in the last three years. About 11.0% of the respondents are not sure of such programs being conducted by ACC.

A majority of those who attended the programs agree that the advocacy program clarified the mandates of ACC, helped to know about corruption offenses, including the type of complaints that are to be lodged to ACC, and the process for lodging complaints to ACC (Table 4).

Table 4: ACC's education and advocacy programs

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
It clarified the mandates of ACC	6.7	81.5	5.2	6.7
It helped me to know about the corruption offenses	7.4	83.7	5.2	3.7
It helped to know what type of complaints are to be lodged to ACC	7.4	69.6	17.0	5.9
It helped me to understand the process for lodging complaints to ACC	7.4	64.4	22.2	5.9

3.15 Type of services prone to corruption

In order to identify the services which are more prone to corruption, the respondents were given a choice to select one from the list of four options (yes, no, do not know and not availed) against each of the services (Figure 48). The six services that were identified as highly prone to corruption were human resource services, construction services, procurement services, municipal services, judiciary services, and local government services.

The percentage of the respondents who reported that procurement and local government services are more prone to corruption rose to 63.6% and 62.0 in 2020 from 46.0% in 2016.




Figure 48: Top six services prone to corruption

3.16 Emerging challenges

From the list of key potential challenges, the respondents were asked to rank them on priority basis as perceived by them. Of the 16 key potential challenges, corruption was ranked fourth (Figure 49). Unemployment was ranked the number one emerging issue, followed by quality of education and health.




Figure 49: Emerging challenges facing the country

CHAPTER4: CONCLUSIONAND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusion

The findings of NCBS 2020 reconfirms the perception of general citizens on the state of corruption in the country and establishes the baseline for assessment of the 12th NKRA 'Corruption Reduced' in the 12th FYP.

The forms of corruption prevalent in the country and its causes have not drastically changed in the last 4 years. The percentage of the respondents who mentioned that they would be obliged to report a case of corruption even if they have to spend a day in court to give evidence has increased in 2020 as compared to that in 2016. The optimism that reporting corruption will make difference increased in 2020 to 88.5% from 71.7% in 2016. The perception that the corruption can be fought against by voting for clean candidates and parties increased from 11.0% in 2016 to 60.0% in 2020.

Amongst the 16 Asia-Pacific countries, Bhutan and Hong Kong ranked 10th with 46% of the respondents saying that the corruption has increased in the last 12 months. Bhutan stood 3rd (62%) in terms of how their respective governments were performing in fighting corruption. Thailand was ranked 1st with 72% of the respondents citing that their government was doing well in fighting corruption. Bhutan and Australia shared the 4th position with only 4% of the respondents saying that they were compelled to pay a bribe to avail government services in the last 12 months. India was at the bottom with 69% of the respondents reported having compelled to pay a bribe.

4.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations were purely deduced from the findings of the study:

- i. Since the findings of the survey reveal trading in influence, conflict of interest and abuse of function as the predominant forms of corruption and the concentration being high at the executive level, in all the categorization of agencies, Strengthening Ethical Leadership and Declaration and Management of Conflict of Interest is highly recommended. This is further corroborated by the National Integrity Assessment Report 2019.
- ii. Key services such as human resource, construction, and procurement have been perceived to be highly prone to corruption. Further, the perception rate in these services has increased substantially from 2016 to 2020. Therefore, it is recommended that ACC collaborate with the relevant agencies to strengthen internal control mechanism in their respective agencies to close the gaps that allow corruption.
- iii. Whistleblowers must be appropriately protected to encourage reporting corruption and wrongdoings. OECD (2009) underscores that the risk of corruption is more severe in an environment where the whistle blower is not protected. It is concerning that about one-fourth of the respondents in this study perceived that the informant is not well protected. Chapter 7 of the Anti-Corruption Act of Bhutan, 2011 ensures protection of the complainants or informers. It requires that the identity of the informer should be kept confidential and not be disclosed in any proceeding before any court, tribunal, or other authority. Therefore, having Whistleblower Protection Act is strongly desired and it is recommended that the legislation be enacted and implemented.

- iv. The ACC's current system of responding on the status and update of the complaints to the complainants needs to be revisited as the general perception on the inaction of the complaints lodged is quite high and negative. So, if there is robust response on the complaints, it will further strengthen the effectiveness of the ACC and will garner sustained confidence and trust.
- v. Corruption offences related to lapses in administrative services such as trading in influence, conflict of interest and abuse of function are increasing as suggested by the survey and as reported in the annual reports of the ACC. Towards this, the current practice of the ACC dealing with the administrative nature of complaints needs to be relooked given the separate mandate and manpower of the ACC. There needs to be an alternate organization to deal with such administrative nature complaints so that the ACC can focus on its core mandate of dealing with corruption offences and its core mandate does not get undermined.
- vi. There seems to be substantial incidences of bribery during elections on one hand and on the other hand the respondents reported that voting for clean candidates and political parties is an effective measure for fighting corruption. Therefore, it is recommended that the Election Commission of Bhutan (ECB) enhance measures to curb corruption in elections.
- vii. The media and CSOs play vital role in fighting corruption. The study found that the effectiveness of media and CSOs in fighting corruption in Bhutan is only at an average level. Therefore, it is recommended that the government supports the capacity building of the media and CSOs in promoting good governance.
- viii. Social accountability is quite a recent phenomenon in Bhutan and as revealed by this study only 16% of the respondents are aware of it. Nevertheless, a substantive portion of those who are aware agree that it is an effective tool to prevent corruption and promote good governance. Thus, it is recommended that the ACC coordinate with relevant agencies like Department of Local Government, CSOs like BTI, etc. to upscale their social accountability program to make it more extensive and inclusive.
- ix. The ACC has been conducting quite a rigorous advocacy and education programs to promote awareness of the general public on corruption related areas. This program is found to be effective for those who have had the opportunity to participate in the programs. Given this, it would be more beneficial if the scope of the advocacy is extended to include/rope in other relevant partners both at the grassroots and national levels in order to promote multiplier effect.
- x. The general perception is that the local governments are more prone to corruption as compared to other services. To a large extent, the process of decentralization has resulted in devolving power and authority to a few elected local leaders with no adequate checks and balances in place. The participation of common citizens in the decision-making process is limited and their involvement in accountability mechanism is weak. Therefore, it is recommended to institute and implement mechanisms to enhance civic responsibility and accountability.

REFERENCES

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Pring, C. (2017). People and Corruption: Asia Pacific - Global Corruption Barometer. Transparency International. OECD. (2009). Committing to Effective Whistle Blower Protection. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Committing-to-Effective-Whistleblower-Protection-Highlights.pdf

ANNEXES

1. Questionnaire

Bhutai some 35 mir	Interior angle of the National Corruption Barometer Survey in angle of the National Corruption Barometer Survey in This survey is being implemented by the Bhutan Transparency Initiative (BTI). I would like to ask you questions about your perception and experience of corruption in the country. This interview will take about utes. The information collected will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. Under no circumstances generate and analyse individual data. Data will be generated and analysed only at an aggregate level.
Part I:	Identifying Information
_	khag:
	Rural:
	Gewog:
Chiwo	J:
Dawt II	Demographic Information
	Demographic Information
	Sex: (m/f)
2.	Age (in completed years): Marital status:
3.	a) Never married
	b) Living together
	c) Married
	d) Widow/widower
	e) Divorced
	f) Others:
4.	Highest level of educational attainment:
٦.	a) No formal education
	b) Primary education (vi)
	c) Lower Secondary (viii)
	d) Middle Secondary (x)
	e) Higher Secondary (xii)
	f) Diploma/certificate
	g) Bachelor's degree
	h) Postgraduate
	i) Non-formal education
	j) Others:
5.	Occupation:
	a) Civil servant
	b) Parliamentarian
	c) Business
	d) Private employee
	e) Corporate employee
	f) Armed force personnel
	a) Farmer/housewife

h) Student

- i) Local government employee
- j) Monk/Nun/Gomchen
- k) NGO/CSO employee
- I) Employee of Constitutional Bodies (who is not a civil servant)
- m) Employee of Autonomous Agencies
- n) Employee of Judiciary

o)	Others:	

Part III: Core Questionnaire

A. Forms of Corruption

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement on the prevountry?	alence of fo	llowing fo	rms of corru	ption in our
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Please backup with an example:				
Embezzlement				
Please backup with an example:				
Bribery				
Please backup with an example:				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
Please backup with an example:				
False claims				
Please backup with an example:				
Abuse of privileged information				
Please backup with an example:				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Please backup with an example:			,	
Money laundering				
Please backup with an example:				
Trading in influence				
Please backup with an example:				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Please backup with an example:			I	I
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement on the prevour country:	alence of co	rruption i	n the followii	ng areas in
	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Hydropower				
Procurement				
Construction				
Elections				
Land				
Environment				
Mines and minerals				

Delivery of justice		
Public prosecution (OAG)		
Human Resources (recruitment, training, transfer, promotion, etc.)		
Others:		

Key service providers: Ministries (MoAF; MoE	A; MoE; MoF; MoFA; N	loH; MoHCA; M	oIC; MoLHR	; MoWHS)
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Judiciary				
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Autonomous agencies (NEC, BAFRA, BNCA, O	AG, RUB, etc.)		
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Constitutional Bodies (R	AA. ACC. RCSC. and E	CB)		

Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Financial institutions (banks,	insurance compa	nies, etc.)	,	
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Corporations (Druk Air; Bhuta	an Telecom; FCB;	BPC; NHDC; DG	PC; etc.)	
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Thromdes				
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				

Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Dzongkhags				
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Gewogs				
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Monastic body				
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Armed Forces (RBA; RBP)				
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				

Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
Concealment of corruption proceeds				
Key service provider: Private Sectors				
Forms of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Abuse of function				
Embezzlement				
Bribery				
Failure to declare a conflict of interest				
False claims				
Abuse of privileged information				
Possession of unexplained wealth				
Money laundering				
Trading in influence				
		1	1	1

Causes of Corruption

What are the course of commution many land in commution				
What are the causes of corruption prevalent in our country?				
Causes of corruption	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
Wants (greed, never enough)				
Needs (sheer necessity, basic minimum not met)				
Lack of information and transparency on rules & procedures				
The Inaction on cases reported				
Strong protective social net of the accused				
Unfair business competition and practices				
Unclear rules with loopholes for manipulation				
Weak leadership at all levels				
Non-enforcement of rules and procedures				
Poor or no proper accountability mechanism				
Social demands and obligations				
Lengthy procedures				
Too many rules to follow				
Weak and ineffective media				
Inefficient service delivery				
Low moral values				
Tradition and culture				
Others				

Level of Corruption

Level of Corruption				
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	rated in the Gover	nment agencie	s?	
Level	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level				
More at the middle administrative and managerial level				
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level				
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	rated in corporation	ons?		
Level	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level				
More at the middle administrative and managerial level				
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level				
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	rated in Autonom	ous agencies?		
Level	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level				
More at the middle administrative and managerial level				
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level				
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	rated in the local	government?		
Level	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level				
More at the middle administrative and managerial level				
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level				
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	rated in NGOs/CS	0s?		
Level	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level				
More at the middle administrative and managerial level				
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level				
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	rated in the Privat	e sector?		
Level	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the Proprietor level				
More at the middle administrative and managerial level				
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level				
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	rated in Constitut	ional bodies?		
Level	Strongly agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level		-		
More at the middle administrative and managerial level				

More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level					
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	trated in J	udiciary	?		
Level	Strongly	y agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level					
More at the middle administrative and managerial level					
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level					
In your opinion, where is corruption mostly concent	trated in A	rmed Fo	rces?		
Level	Strongly	y agree	Partly agree	Disagree	Don't know
More at the executive level					
More at the middle administrative and managerial level					
More at the lower supervisory/support and operational level					
How many of the following people do you think are	involved i	n corrup	tion?		
	None	Some of them		All of them	Don't know
The Prime Minister and Officials in his Office					
Ministers					
Members of Parliament					
Government officials					
Local government elected leaders					
Officials of Law enforcement and regulatory agencies (Armed Forces, ACC, RAA, BAFRA, Department of Immigration, etc.)					
Armed force personnel					
Judges/Justices					
Religious figures (Khenpo, Tulkus, etc.)					
Business executives					
Service providers like teachers, education personnel, health workers, agriculture extension officers, etc.					
Journalists and media personnel					
CSOs/NGOs					
International organizations (development partners)					

Trend of Corruption

Please rate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:								
	Very serious problem	Serious problem	Somewhat serious problem	Not a serious problem	Not a problem at all	Don't know		
Corruption in Bhutan is:								

In your opinion, in the last three years, ha	as the level of as	rruntion in this source	try changed? (Tie	[c)
Increased a lot	is the level of co	Truption in this coun	try changed: (110	к)
Increased somewhat				
Stayed the same				
Decreased somewhat				
Decreased a lot				
Don't know				
For example:				
B. Reporting and Fighting Corruption	 1			
Were you ever compelled to pay a bribe t		ces?		
a. Yes				
b. No				
If yes, how often, did you have to pay a br services you needed?	ibe, give a gift, or	do a favor for a gov	ernment official to	get the
a. Once; b. a few times; c. often/ma	ny times			
Did you report any of the incidences of c	orruption to any	relevant governmen	t authority/agency	/ ?
No				
Yes				
Can't remember				
Don't know				
If you had reported, which of the following	g happened as a	result of reporting?	1	
	Not applicable	No, didn't happen	Yes, happened	Don't know
Authorities took action against the concerned official(s) involved				
You suffered retaliation or other negative consequences as a result of report-				
ing the incident				
Others:				
Some people say that many incidences of do you think are the reasons why people			ed on your experi	ence, what
People don't have enough time to report i	t			
People don't know where to report it				
People don't know how to report it				
Nothing will be done/it wouldn't make a d	lifference			
It's too expensive to report (e.g. due to tra	vel or phone cha	arges)		
Corruption is normal/everyone does it/ev	eryone is involve	d		
People are afraid of the consequences				
The officials where they would report to a	re also corrupt/c	officials are involved	in the corruption	
It's the government's money, not the peop	ole's, so it's not ou	ur problem		
Corrupt people are protected				

Other [specify]						
Don't know						
Do you know what process to follow in reporting a corr	upt act?	•				
a. Yes						
b. No						
If yes, please rate the process of corruption reporting		T				
	npletely agree	Disagr	ee Agre		npletely agree	Don't' know
The process is easily accessible						
This process is user friendly						
The process is effective						
The process is simple						
The reporter is well protected (confidentially maintained)						
What can you, as a citizen, do to fight corruption in the given below:	e countr	y? (sele	ect the mos	st releva	nt options	
Nothing/ordinary people cannot do anything						
Refuse to pay bribes						
Report corruption when you see or experience it						
Vote for clean candidates or parties						
Speak out about the problem, for example, by calling a	radio pr	ogram (or writing a	letter		
Talk to friends and relatives about the problem						
Sign a petition asking for a stronger fight against corru	ıption					
Join or support an organization that is fighting corrupt	ion					
Other [specify]						
Don't know						
Rate your agreement or disagreement on the followin	n staten	nents:				
Trace your agreement or along recinion on the removing						Τ
		ongly agree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know
Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption						
There is no desire and will to combat corruption in our country.						
In our society, it is generally acceptable for people to report a case of corruption they have witnessed						
If I would witness an act of corruption, I would feel per sonally obliged to report it	-					
I would report a case of corruption even if I would have to spend a day in court to give evidence	9					

Explain why:	 	 	

C.	The govern	ment's effe	ectiveness in	controlling	corruption

How would you rate the present government in handling the following matters?							
	Very Badly	Fairly Badly	Fairly Well	Very Well	Haven't heard enough		
Fighting corruption in the government							
Promoting good governance							
Upholding respect for the rule of law							

Political parties in preventing corruption and promoting good governance

How effective are the registered political parties in preventing corruption?									
	Very effective	Effective	Not effective	DK/Haven't heard enough					
Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT)									
Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT)									
People's Democratic Party (PDP)									
Bhutan Kuen-Nyam Party (BKP)									

Why	•

D. ACC's effectiveness in preventing and combating corruption

Have you heard about the Anti-Corruption Commission in the	ave you heard about the Anti-Corruption Commission in this country?							
a. Yes								
b. b. No		1	,					
	Heard the name, but don't know anything about what they do	A fair amount	A great deal					
If yes, how much do you know about the ACC?								

List at least three most important activities that you think that ACC is doing as of today:_____

How would you rate the following statements regarding the ACC?	Very Badly	Fairly Badly	Fairly Well	Very Well	Don't know
1. Public education					
Why/give reasons?					
2. Preventing corruption					
Why/give reasons?					
3. Investigating corruption					
Why/give reasons?					
4. Handling of corruption complaints					
Why/give reasons?					

Corruption in elections

Have you experienced being offered any payment in the form of cash or kind or favour to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last general election?					
	Yes	No	Don't know		
Yourself					
Another member of your household					
A member of your constituency					

Have you experienced being intimidated or influenced to vote for a particular candidate or a party in the last local government election?					
	Yes	No	Don't know		
Yourself					
Another member of your household					
A member of your constituency					

The role and effectiveness of media in preventing corruption and promoting good governance

	e are the media in preventing and expos sure effectiveness)	ing corruption a	nd promotir	ng good governa	nce?
<u></u>		Very effective	Effective	Not effective	Don't know
	Preventing corruption (reporting on awareness programs being carried out by the ACC)				
Print media	Creating Deterrence (Reporting on corruption through investigative journalism)				
	Promoting good governance (reporting on good governance systems/initiatives)				
	Preventing corruption (reporting on awareness programs being carried out by the ACC				
Radio	Creating Deterrence (Reporting on corruption through investigative journalism)				
	Promoting good governance (reporting on good governance systems/initiatives)				
	Preventing corruption (reporting on awareness programs being carried out by the ACC)				
Television	Creating Deterrence (Reporting on corruption through investigative journalism)				
	Promoting good governance (reporting on good governance systems/initiatives)				
Social media	Preventing corruption (reporting on awareness programs being carried out by the ACC)				
	Creating Deterrence (Reporting on corruption through investigative journalism)				
	Promoting good governance (reporting on good governance systems/initiatives)				

	1. ((1. 1				_
How should the	media effectively	prevent and expos	e corruntion and	nromote acod	dovernance?

a. The role and effectiveness of CSOs/NGOs in preventing corruption and/or promoting anti-corruption initiatives

How effective are the CSOs in preventing corruption and promoting good governance?					
	Very effective Effective Not effective Don				
CCO2/NCO2	Preventing corruption				
CSOs/NGOs	Promoting good governance				

What should the CSOs/NGOs do to effectively prevent corruption and promote good governance?

b. Social accountability

Are you aware of the term "Social Accountability"?

- (i) Yes
- (ii) No

If Yes, what is it?

Do you think we have an enabling environment to practice "Social accountability"?

Explain: _____

How effective are social accountability tools in preventing corruption and promoting good governance?						
		Very effective	Effective	Not effective	Don't know	
Conial annountability	Preventing corruption					
Social accountability	Promoting good governance					

i. ACC's Education and Advocacy Programs

Have you attended any education or advocacy sessions conducted by ACC in the last three years?

Yes	No	Not sure

If yes, please rate the following statements related to advocacy sessions conducted by ACC:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
It clarified the mandates of ACC				
It helped me to know the corruption offenses				
It helped to know what type of complaints are to be lodged to ACC				
It helped me to understand the process for lodging complaints to ACC				

According to you, which of the following services is more prone to corruption?

Services	Yes	No	Don't know	Not availed
Agriculture services				
Land transaction services				
Education services				
Banking Services				
Travel Document services				
Government clearances services				

	1		
Health services			
Licensing services			
Immigration and census services			
Labor permits and inspection services			
Auditing services			
Police services			
Judiciary services			
Construction services			
City/Municipal services/Thromde			
Corporate services (BPC, Bhutan Telecom, etc.)			
Procurement services			
Finance services (payment, releases, etc.)			
Local Government services			
Administrative/management services			
Religious and monastic Services			
NGOs/CSOs services			
Human Resource Services			
Services not mentioned			

j. Emerging Challenges

From the list of key potential challenges, please list top 5 challenges	es according to you:
	Rank
Macroeconomic stability (Debt)	
Economic diversification	
Poverty and inequality	
Preservation of culture	
Health	
Climate change and disaster resilient	
Quality education	
Food and nutrition security	
Government Services	
Gender equality	
Unemployment	
Corruption reduction	
Free and fair Democracy	
Community vitality	
Rule of Law	
Quality Infrastructures and services	
Water sustainability	
Other responses	

Why:	 	
•		
Any other comments:		
,		

2. Selected Primary Sampling Units

Region	Urban/ Rural	Population (%)	PSU using PPS
Western (Chukha, Paro, Thimphu, Haa,	Urban	50	 Chukha – Phuntsholing Thromde – Pasakha Lap Paro – Paro Town – Lap 5 Thimphu – Thimphu Thromde – Dechencholing Thimphu – Thimphu Thromde – Zilukha Thimphu – Thimphu Thromde – Core Thimphu – Thimphu Thromde – Changzamtok Thimphu – Thimphu Thromde – Lungtenphu Thimphu – Thimphu Thromde – Babesa
Samtse, Punakha, Gasa)	Rural	50	 Chukha - Bjagchog - Tashigatshel Chukha - Phuntsholing - Ligndaen Haa - Sangbay - Mochhu Paro - Lamgong - Tsendonang Punakha - Kabisa - Sirigang_Wakoo Damchhi Samtse - Tading - Khempagang_Panzhing Samtse - Tashichhoeling - Tashichhoeling Thimphu - Kawang - Dazhi-Zhoshuel
	Urban	22	1. Bumthang – Chumig Town – Lap 2 2. Tsirang – Mendrelgang Town – Lap 1 3. Wangduephodrang – Rurichu Town – Lap 1
Central (Trongsa, Tsirang, Wangdue- phodrang, Daga- na, Zhemgang, Bumthang)	Rural	78	 Bumthang - Chumig - Zungngye Dagana - Karna - Dalithang_Gangyab_Khagochen Dagana - Gesarling - Gesarling Trongsa - Dragteng - Samling Khatoed Trongsa - Tangsibji - Tangsibji Tsirang - Rangthangling - Neymedsa Tsirang - Pungtenchu - Peljorling Wangduphodrang - Darkar - Sili_taagsha Wangduphodrang - Thedtsho - Rinchengang_Maed Wangduphodrang - Nyishog - Chhaebhakha Zhemgang - Nangkor - Duenmang Zhemgang - Phangkhar - Mamo_Trong_Pantang
	Urban	24	 Monger – Mongar Town – Lap 5 s/Jongkhar – S/Jongkhar Thromde – Football ground side Sarpang – Gelephu Thromde – Lap 3 Trashigang – Kanglung Town – Lap 3
Eastern (S/ Jongkhar, Tashi- gang, Mongar, Lhuentse, Pemagat- shel, Sarpang, Tashi- yangtse)	Rural	76	 i. Lhuentse – Tsaenkhar – Go-Nyid_Wambur ii. Monger – Thang-Rong – Bauchhoeling_Panglen iii. Monger – Mongar – Wengkhar_Yagpoogang iv. Pemagatshel - Shumar – Bartseri v. S/Jongkhar – Gomdar – Narphhong vi. S/Jongkhar – Pemathang – Raling vii. Sarpang - Gelephu – Lekidthang viii. Sarpang – Chhudzom – Sherabling ix. Trashigang – Shongphu – Galing x. Trashigang – Phongmed – Thong-Rong xi. Trashigang – Khaling – Bayphu_Togkaphu xii. Trashiyangtse – Khamdang – Khamdang_Manla